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ABSTRACT 
With the number and severity of disasters seemingly on the rise, there is an increased call 
for enhancing resilience to mitigate the post-event costs.  Resilience is widely understood 
to revolve around the demography, geography, sociology, and economy of the area under 
study.  What is not known is what other factors have measurable effects on the overall 
resilience of communities.  One potential factor in this equation is political subculture, 
Dr. Daniel Elazar’s term for the cultural stance of a community with regards to views on 
government and politics and their role in the society.  In seeking to discover whether 
political subculture affects the resilience of a community, the author used analysis of 
disaster case studies from three representative communities—each highlighting one of 
Dr. Elazar’s three subcultures of Traditional, Individual and Moral—to investigate 
whether pre-evaluated resilience values and predicted response to disaster coincided with 
actual event outcomes.  By using the Social Vulnerability Index values established by Dr. 
Susan Cutter as a baseline metric for a quantifiable measure of resilience, the author 
found that political subculture affects resiliency and should be further researched as a 
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Natural disasters continue to rock the globe and, per meteorologists and scientists 
worldwide, will likely increase in number and intensify in strength (Reuters, 2007).  In 
addition, manmade disasters such as terrorist incidents and hazardous material spills are 
increasing in frequency and magnitude (Department of Commerce, 2010).  Studies 
likewise show that the number of Presidential Disaster Declarations is on the rise in the 
United States, indicating an upward trend in reliance on federal governmental aid for 
disaster relief.  To some degree this diminution in own-source resilience can be attributed 
to increased urbanization, which in turn leads to greater recovery costs after disasters 
(Earthscan, 2007).  A sample of the past 21 years of United States Presidential Disaster 
Declarations is illustrated in Table 1, showing an upward trend in both numbers of 
declarations and costs illustrative of the concept of increased disaster costs overall.  There 
are many argued causes for the increase in federal disaster declaration—increase in scope 
and size of disasters, learned dependence on federal aid in lieu of local capabilities, larger 
population centers, and media attention leading to increased public outcry for action 
come to mind.  The data reflect an upward curve in cost and number of declarations, 
though, and while all factors above are involved, the increased reliance on federal aid is 
the focus of this paper.  It is not the sole factor in the illustrated upward trend in Table 1, 
but the nature of a community’s reliance on government assistance is a factor in calling 
for outside aid (or not) and thus worthy of deeper investigation.  The data in Table 1 is 
only reflective of declarations through 2008, but in noting the summation at the bottom of 
the table, a significant trend is visible.   
Table 1.   Presidential Disaster Declarations (From Sylves, Hoetmer, & Racca, 2010) 
  Reagan  GHWBush Clinton  GWBush  Total 
1989 1 30 0 0  31 
1990 0 38 0 0  38 
1991 0 43 0 0  43 
1992 0 45 0 0  45 
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  Reagan  GHWBush Clinton  GWBush  Total 
1993 0 2 30 0  32 
1994 0 0 36 0  36 
1995 0 0 33 0  33 
1996 0 0 74 0  74 
1997 0 0 44 0  44 
1998 0 0 65 0  65 
1999 0 0 50 0  50 
2000 0 0 45 0  45 
2001 0 0 4 41  45 
2002 0 0 0 49  49 
2003 0 0 0 56  56 
2004 0 0 0 68  68 
2005 0 0 0 48  48 
2006 0 0 0 52  52 
2007 0 0 0 63  63 
2008 0 0 0 75  75 
Total 1 158 381 452  992 
Not only is the number of declarations increasing, but the overall cost of disaster 
aid is climbing swiftly. Table 2 shows the overall cost of these disasters by administration 
in thousands of dollars (table value x 1000).  An upward trend of fiscal outlay is quite 
visible when the data is collated in this manner even with the limitations of data available 
at the start and end of the monitored periods. 
Table 2.   Presidential Disaster Declaration Costs (After Sylves, Hoetmer, & Racca, 
2010) 
Administration Timeframe Total (x$1000) 
Reagan 1981–1989 $1,892 (data represents last 
year in office) 
G. H. W. Bush 1989–1993 $9,823,833 
Clinton 1993–2001 $31,071,445 
G.W. Bush 2001–2009 $88,721,307 
Obama 2009–Present $1,372,306 (data represents 
residual cost of prior 
administration events) 
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Communities and governments are continually analyzing and planning for the 
next big disaster in hopes that recovery will go swiftly and smoothly.  One word often 
used in the context of emergency management is “mitigation”—the ability to reduce the 
effects of a hazard before an event occurs.  Mitigation, though, is a tricky political issue 
in that many efforts cannot be achieved through construction or money but require a shift 
in culture or mindset on the part of the populace.  An example of this is the failure of 
levees in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.  A great deal of government funding 
was put toward the upkeep and repair of the levee system during the preceding decades, 
though not all was spent as planned.  For example, over $17 million was diverted by the 
Louisiana-run Orleans Levee Board to recreational projects that included a $2.4 million 
Mardi Gras Fountain and $15 million for two overpasses to grant better access to Bally’s 
Riverboat Casino (Meyers, 2005). In part, the political culture of New Orleans inhibited 
the proper maintenance of the levee system and, no matter how much money was 
targeted at the problem (Garcia, 2009), the conclusion was a failure of physical protective 
systems that cost thousands of people their homes and hundreds their lives (Seed, 2006).   
The resilience of the community—the community’s capability to anticipate risk, 
limit impact, and rebound rapidly through survival, adaptability, evolution, and growth in 
the face of turbulent change—bears a direct relationship to mitigation efforts applied to 
hazards affecting that community (Community and Regional Resilience Institute, 2006).  
Resilience has become the focus of planners at all levels due to climbing costs of 
recovery.  In an era of economic difficulty characterized by budget shortfalls, funds 
invested in mitigation and resilience have proven to save post-disaster costs (Lewis, 
2006). 
Perhaps the clearest definition of resilience comes from Joshua Ramo, who likens 
resilience to “a measure of how much disturbance a system can absorb before it breaks 
down so fundamentally that it can’t easily return to the way it once was” (2009, p. 172).  
A more resilient community should, by definition, weather and recover from disasters 
better than less resilient communities, all other factors taken into account (i.e., education, 
economics, demography, and geography).  In short, the “will problem” is more severe 
 4
than the “skill problem,”—military parlance for defining whether a failure to perform is 
due more to lack of desire or willpower versus lack of knowledge or training.   
What, then, enhances a community’s overall resilience?  In seeking to understand 
resilience, one must look at the factors which can affect the status quo, or normal state of 
affairs within a community—disasters, changes in population, economic turmoil or any 
other things that can dislodge a community from a normal state.  Knowledge of these 
potential disruptions enables an educated planning effort that anticipates effects upon the 
community and enables pre-event mitigation measures to be employed.  Examples of 
resilience, good and bad, exist in current times and are tested by many external factors 
especially climate change and natural disasters, terrorism, and the effects of a global 
economy and interconnectedness.  This thesis, however, will focus on disasters as a 
whole defined as an amalgam of events that have drastic damaging effects upon a 
community or region regardless of cause. 
One does not have to look far to see recent examples of disasters and their 
consequences.  Hurricanes Katrina and Rita imposed massive devastation on the Gulf 
Coast and rendered heart-wrenching images of human suffering.  These storms and their 
outcomes raised many questions about the nation’s ability to recover from such massive 
disasters and resulted in tremendous shake-ups of government agencies and response 
paradigms.  Only later did questions begin to arise about the role of the affected 
communities in preparing for such disasters.  After all, when one lives on the Gulf Coast 
of the United States, should one not take hurricanes into account when planning home 
sites, construction projects and preparedness activities? Or, is it indeed the “the 
government’s job” to step in and provide all needed resources and recovery should 
something occur?  Initial cost estimates of the damage from the two storms were 141 
billion dollars, not counting the environmental impact or loss of life (Burton & Hicks, 
2005).  
The question of what fraction of responsibility lies with the public and with the 
government was again raised following the 2008 floods in the Midwest.  Once more, 
television screens were dominated by images of devastation but without the desperate 
pleas for outside assistance.  Instead, viewers saw images of local communities banding 
 5
together to protect homes against rising water and working to clean up the after-effects 
once the rivers had calmed again.  In both Katrina and the Midwest floods, water was the 
damaging agent, but with a markedly different response on the part of government and 
citizens during and after the disasters.  Preliminary cost estimates for the floods and 
recovery in the Midwest placed expenses near 15 billion dollars (Infoplease.com, 2009), 
though final costs have yet to be fully tallied and posted to a government source. 
Why is there such a disparity in cost of recovery from two water-based, 
geographically extensive disasters?  The factors influencing the responses and the 
communities are many, ranging from economic factors, government influence (and some 
would argue, interference), societal norms and culture, political cultures, and many other 
factors.  The commonly accepted metrics used to quantify the resilience of an area are 
found in the examination of economy, geography, demography, and sociology.  While a 
direct relationship between any one factor, or even a combination thereof, and the 
resilience of a community is unknown, it would seem that certain factors may well have 
more influence than others. Some attempts have been made to measure and quantify these 
factors through experiments and models such as the Social Vulnerability Index (Cutter, 
Boruff & Shirley, 2003).  This theory has been speculated upon and explored to some 
extent in business models, which are a form of community unto themselves, leading to 
the theory that similar factors and relationships would affect entire communities (McCoy 
and Elwood, 2009).  Resilience indices are subject to extensive research as planners seek 
to quantify a measurable value of community preparedness and resilience to enhance pre-
disaster planning efforts.  Modifiers, taken as variables that would change raw data, to 
these quantified resilience factors or indices, however, are unexplored, which is 
unfortunate given the potential change to predicted response and variation to planned 
resilience.  One potential modifier that stands out particularly is the influence of, and 
public desire for, government intervention in both preparation and response as evidenced 
in the disparate reactions to Federal Emergency Management Agency aid between the 
Gulf Coast and the Midwest.  These differences in attitudes toward government and 
individual responsibility have been identified in the literature as political subcultures.   
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Dr. Daniel Elazar expanded on the theories of political subcultures—an 
underlying culture based on a community’s view on government and politics and shaped 
by background, tradition, economics and religion (Elazar, 1984)—and their effects on the 
actions, thoughts, culture, and responses of the people (Riley, n.d.).  Dr. Elazar’s theories 
are founded in the sociological and theological roots of a region or area and might allow 
predicting anticipated behavior of citizens that may have magnifying or minimizing 
effects on the resilience of that area. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is the relationship between the political sub-culture of a community 
and that community’s resilience in the face of catastrophic events? 
2. If there is a relationship, can the effect of political subculture on 
community resilience be quantified?   
C. HYPOTHESIS 
Multiple disasters have ravaged the United States over the past several years.  No 
region is immune from disaster, whether natural or manmade, and all must be prepared.  
Part of preparation is the inherent resilience of a community—its self-sufficiency, 
willingness and ability to respond to its own needs, and its overall capability to weather 
and recover from disaster.  This capability may vary throughout the U.S. due to several 
factors including population, jurisdictional geographic size, emergency response 
population, planning efforts and political influence in either preparing for or failing to 
prepare for disasters.  Further, the various regions of the country have deeply rooted 
characteristics that influence the reactions and resilience of the people living there.  
Resilience, as an aggregation of community characteristics, is beginning to be explored 
with research extending into quantifiable measures based on the traditional foundations 
of economy, sociology, demography and geography.  As yet, though, limited research has 
delved into cultural factors which would modify the calculated resilience of an area. 
Dr. Daniel Elazar postulated that regions within the United States can be 
classified by “political subculture”—a term that attempts to capture the feeling of a 
region towards government influence and interaction, whether the government be local, 
state, federal or (Elazar, 1984).  His theory posits three subcultures—moral, individual, 
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and traditional.  Predominant trend places moral, where the view is that government 
exists for the good of the community as a whole, in the north and western U.S., 
Individual, where government is a necessary evil that keeps markets viable, is primarily 
in the Midwest and middle Atlantic states.  Traditional subculture which sees government 
as a noble calling handled by an elite few to maintain the status quo for all, is 
predominantly distributed through the southern and southeastern U.S. (Riley, 2010).  The 
author posits that, when one takes into account the general locations of these subcultures 
as well as historical evidence of disparate response to and dependence on government aid 
and assistance during several recent disasters (Morrow, 2008) political subculture, while 
not the sole factor, has an influence, or modifying effect, on community resilience.  
Subsequently, by knowing the subculture, one can reasonably predict the level of 
resilience likely to exist, all other factors taken into consideration.  For example, a 
traditional subculture, by its definition of respecting government as a higher calling and 
looking to government to maintain the status quo for all with little effort on the part of the 
populous (Elazar, 1984), would be less resilient as the cultural underpinnings of the 
community do not call for citizen participation or preparedness.  To what degree the 
subculture affects the overall resilience index is the focus of this thesis and Dr. Elazar’s 
theories will be expanded in Chapter II.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
In this thesis, the idea of community resilience as it is affected by 
community/political culture and what factors make a community more resilient will be 
explored.  To date, a great deal of research has gone into extrapolating the influence of 
economics, geography, sociology and demographics upon community resilience and 
these relationships are beginning to be established and researched.  What is not quantified 
is the relationship between political subculture, or other influences, and resilience. This 
thesis will concentrate on one influence, Dr. Elazar’s theory of political subculture, and 
quantify the effect it has on overall resilience.  From that data, further and more complete 
models of resilience can be generated which may be used to help predict response 
capability, and in so doing offer data that may help direct preparedness efforts to address 
critical vulnerabilities.   
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At this time, government officials and planners rely on Department of Homeland 
Security planning factors and “worst case scenarios” that all communities, regardless of 
size, must plan around to allocate financial assistance and grants, a process which at best 
causes a “peanut butter spread” of resources across all states and communities without 
due recourse to actual needs and threats.  These measures do not capture the factors that 
may help one community survive and bounce back from a disaster where a neighboring 
community might fail.  Not every community requires the same degree of support or 
resources, either due to a lesser degree of threat (a politically untenable statement) or to a 
greater degree of resilience.  In the interest of creating a more unified and defined 
approach to community resilience and disaster preparedness, more information is 
required to truly understand why similar disasters in different regions of the country can 
wind up having such diverse responses from communities. 
Given that disasters are not likely to decrease in quantity or frequency, 
preparation for and response to future events will need to continue to be honed to ensure 
most efficient allocation of time and resources.  No “cookie cutter” approach exists that 
grants a whole-picture view of communities and States that would allow a situational-
dependent plan to be put in place, tailored to the needs of that particular area and 
ultimately enhance the resilience of the community.  With such a wide scope of potential 
disasters to plan for, highlighting one potential relationship that helps to determine 
resilience may assist communities in conducting risk analysis.  Simply put, knowing a 
greater number of community characteristics helps planners better define the potential 
scope of assets needed to enhance resilience or recovery efforts.  While this thesis does 
not purport to highlight political subculture as a singular determinant factor of resilience, 
it does delve further into the overall metric of resilience and how political subculture may 
increase or decrease a known vulnerability index.  Furthermore, enhanced ability to 
quantify resilience can provide a starting point for further study into the sociological 
effects upon a community and its survivability and vulnerability, facilitating better 
overall planning with each clarification of determinant factors. 
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Finally, in preparing this thesis for publication, the author has further delved into 
literature on resilience and brought several diverse sources together.  This list of sources 
can be used to further additional research into this growing area of interest. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This portion of the thesis discusses the array of literature available on resilience as 
the topic relates to homeland security.  This includes the commonly accepted four factors 
of resilience as highlighted by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute and the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Community and Regional Resilience Institute as 
well as leading thinkers in the field such as Dr. Samuel Clovis—geography, demography, 
economy and sociology—which are normally used in analyzing the resilience index of a 
community or region. Also reviewed is Dr. Elazar’s theory of political subculture (as 
discussed in Chapter I) and the existing debates on validity and timeliness of the theory.  
Both of these items must be explained in totality before one explores the proposition that 
there is a connection between the two. 
A. CURRENT FACTORS OF RESILIENCE 
Resilience is currently a topic of interest throughout the homeland security 
community.  Much like homeland security itself, a common definition of resilience has 
yet to emerge (Cutter, 2008).  A number of organizations and research institutes are 
examining factors affecting resilience, while the federal government, particularly the 
Department of Homeland Security, is pursuing resilience as a prevention modality 
(Napolitano, 2010).  A great deal of the published work on resilience deals with hazard 
planning (Cutter, 2008), focusing efforts towards risk mitigation through planning.  One 
noted gap in research on resilience concerns the factors affecting it—rather, the research 
seems to focus on obstacles to planning for disasters and indicators of resilience (items 
which can be used as planning factors) (Berke & Campanella, 2006).  A metric has been 
developed called the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI), which takes into account a 
number of socio-economic factors within census areas (Cutter et al., 2003).   
This SoVI metric is of particular interest as it provides a quantifiable measure of 
the resilience (measured as vulnerability, so an inverse resilience where higher SoVI 
values imply lower resilience).  Cutter et al. (2003) broke the United States down by 
counties to measure multiple factors of resilience across the country.  They compiled 
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data, mostly from the U.S. Census Bureau, detailing multiple socio-economic factors and 
standardized this data across the country to create a measurable value that could be used 
as a tool to determine differential recovery from environmental disasters.  Ultimately, 32 
socio-economic factors (from an initial 42) were accounted for in the SoVI calculations, 
all agreed upon by research literature processed by the Hazards and Vulnerability 
Research Institute of the University of South Carolina as key factors in determining the 
ability of a community to prepare for, respond to and recover from hazards.  The SoVI 
factors accounted for seventy-six percent of the variance noted in disaster recovery and 
resilience and thus are a good representation of resilience in a consistent, numerical value 
system that can be compared across different regions of the country. 
Nowhere among these selected values, however, is a factor measuring the impact 
or influence of political subculture or the associated behaviors on resilience (Cutter, 
2008).  This is not to discount the broad impact of these known factors upon resilience 
but simply to enhance the definition to include other potential factors. Resilience, as an 
operational term, will be defined in this thesis as the ability of a community to withstand 
a disastrous event and return to normal life (i.e., business open, people travelling, 
children attending school, and social and physical services in place and functional).  For 
purposes of this thesis, resilience will be examined in the context of the overall Social 
Vulnerability Index, taking into account the four main factors of economy, demography, 
sociology and geography.  The general agreement among resilience academics is the need 
for further metrics and indices that can be applied to measure community resilience more 
effectively. 
There is a significant gap in the study of the relationship between the resilience of 
a community and the reliance on government (local, state and/or federal) in times of 
crisis. The relative reliance on government by a community in times of crisis is a 
reasonable output of Dr. Elazar’s definition of political subculture, a theory grounded 
initially in faith-based factors and immigration patterns within the United States but also 
encompassing social structures to define the behavioral nature of communities.  In this 
thesis, a community is defined as a recognized city, town or similar metropolitan area (to 
include associated suburbs and districts) that is made up of physical infrastructure, 
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economic and social capital, natural environment and systems/essential services provided 
to citizens of that community as well as the citizens themselves.  It is more than a 
collection of structures.  The community is an interactive environment sustaining a way 
of life and society as established by the persons living in that community.  In addition, a 
community is governed by officials elected by the members of that community and 
supported by infrastructure which is in turn enabled by taxes and fees collected from 
citizens of the community.  Within the arena of political culture and subculture, a great 
deal of anthropological study has taken place looking at all manner of impacts and factors 
that influence communities—whether that community be a family, ethnic group, city or 
region.  More specifically, a significant body of work exists that looks into how 
communities react to outside influence—government involvement or interference, 
weather, disasters, and turbulence in the economy—and how those reactions are 
influenced by various aspects of the culture or subculture of the communities.1  Cicchetti 
and Luthar examined the effect of community culture on resilience as it applied to 
psychological impact and found that a correlation existed with respect to the anticipated 
reaction to an external stimulus (2000).  Dynes, meanwhile, postulated that communities 
possess the necessary tools to react safely to disasters, but that current counter-terrorist 
policies are undercutting the social capital that creates a culture of resilience (Dynes, 
2005). 
Overall, experts agree that there are four major influences upon a community’s 
resilience: economy, demography, geography and sociology.  In the subsections that 
follow, the author will develop each discipline as it relates to community resilience and 
homeland security. 
1. Economy 
It is a common assumption in American society to point to affluence as a factor in 
allowing a community to better weather and recover faster from disasters.  In theory, a 
                                                 
1 The CARRI Website contains a vast store of research conducted in partnership with the Department 
of Homeland Security.  It is representative of a number of such projects being conducted to study resilience 
and factors affecting communities.  From the Website: “CARRI is developing a common framework 
including processes and tools that communities and regions can use to assess their resilience, determine a 
resilience vision and take concrete actions that will have positive economic and social results.” 
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community with a stronger revenue base would be better prepared to withstand a disaster, 
have a more robust and well-funded emergency response system and in general, be more 
survivable (Polese, 2010).  Current data tend to disprove this theory in part.  To some 
aspect, wealth does enable factors that improve resilience.  More affluent neighborhoods 
tend to have larger tax bases that in turn facilitate better public schools.  To this end, a 
more educated populace is more likely to respond appropriately in the face of a disaster, 
so wealth is a potential indirect multiplier (Clovis, 2008).  This tends to be a cyclic 
phenomenon as well, with greater wealth fostering better education which fostering better 
economic success and so on.  Longstaff et al. argue that a robust economy is key to 
resilience—a greater tax base provides better and newer infrastructure which in turn aids 
survivability and recoverability, describing a robust economy as a sort of “shock 
absorber” for the community (2010).  Paton notes that a capacity to adapt is dependent on 
the existence of resources to confront challenges—a clear function of a viable economy 
to provide those resources (Paton, 2008).  In its simplest view, a community with more 
resources can, as long as those resources are well-applied, enhance its resilience by 
“buying down risk” (Lewis, 2006). 
By contrast, however, wealthy neighborhoods in New Orleans took just as long to 
repopulate after Hurricane Katrina as did less-affluent neighborhoods.  This may be less 
due to the economy of the areas affected, though, than due to the sheer ferocity of the 
disaster unleashed upon the city.  After all, floodwaters do not differentiate between a 
$250,000 home and an $80,000 one.  This is somewhat mitigated by the knowledge that 
more affluent areas were able to evacuate more quickly due to availability of funds and 
transport, and were able to return to a sense of normalcy faster due to the ability to 
provide, through increased availability to buy services, a return to routine life (i.e., even 
if water is out, the ability to purchase large quantities of bottled water makes possible 
cooking, and showering).  Economically, the ability to purchase commodities that help 




Chamlee-Wright and Storr have delved extensively into the makeup of a 
community and the effects of this structure upon resilience.  While some aspects tie with 
sociology as well, a great deal of the cultural background and temperament of a 
community is based upon the demography of its population.  A number of researchers 
have also compiled data examining the characterization of populations and how that 
demographic makeup affects the capacity for adaptation through psychological, social 
and cultural resources (Paton, 2008). 
In addition, “vulnerable” (at risk or special needs) populations tend to decrease a 
community’s resilience by requiring special health, evacuation and other considerations 
in the event of a disaster.  Communities, and more importantly, their governing bodies, 
that are not aware of the demography of their population or the populations in high-
priority facilities such as nursing facilities have struggled during evacuations and 
response events, diverting multiple resources to small populations and away from the 
general community at large.  Demography influences the ability of populations to prepare 
for disaster, both individually and on a community level, an effect which has been 
modeled to great extent (Paton & Johnston, 2001). 
Another factor of demography that has been extensively explored is that of 
environmental effects and vulnerabilities associated with varying populations.  Boyce, 
Haridas, Lee, & National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis [NCEAS] 
Stochastic Demography Working Group put considerable time into stochastically 
modeling the effects of demography on vital statistics of populations (2006).  A 
stochastic model is a tool for estimating probability distributions of potential outcomes by 
allowing for random variation in one or more inputs over time.  Stochastic variation in 
structured population models influences estimates of population growth rate, persistence 
and resilience.  This model provides a look into the variations of population such as “at 
risk” factors (poverty levels andspecial-needs populations) and predicts the effect of 
those population segments on community factors to include resilience.  Another aspect of 
this is the internal demography of a community and how it affects the ability of 
community residents to work together toward a unified goal, such as disaster recovery 
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(Paton, 2008; Lasker, 2004).  If a population is comprised of groups that traditionally 
distrust each other, for whatever reason, unified effort even in the face of a common 
threat may be hampered or even prevented.  A community made up of groups who can 
function well together reduces the friction of conflict and allows all energy to be focused 
on the preparatory and recovery efforts required.  Likewise, a community that contains 
numerous special-needs populations may struggle toward normalcy after an event due to 
the disproportionate consumption of recovery resources by those populations. 
3. Geography 
The geography of a region influences multiple aspects of its resilience, ranging 
from the type of weather phenomena it will experience to ease or difficulty of transport of 
relief assets into and out of affected areas.  A great deal of work has gone into defining 
geography and its many subcategories that range from racial to physical to social media.  
Some argue that traditional, map-based geographical definitions are not valid in the era of 
globalization and social networking (Felts, 2009).  The Community and Regional 
Resilience Institute (CARRI) define community as “a group bound by geography and 
perceived self-interest that carries out common functions” (Plodinec, 2009).  If this 
definition is valid, then the very nature of a community is determined by its geographic 
make-up or boundaries.  By this logic, if resilience is assumed to be a trait of the 
community, a direct link can be seen between geography and resilience through 
extrapolation.  In addition, geography defines the vulnerability of a region or community, 
as noted by Reser and Morrissey in terms of site and situation of place (Reser & 
Morrissey, 2008).  One aspect of a community’s very existence is the environmental 
sphere or physical setting (Schwab, Eschelbach, & Brower, 2007).  One can argue that 
southern Florida need not prepare for blizzards or Colorado set aside resources to deal 
with a hurricane in downtown Denver–the physical setting of a community sets fairly 
rigid parameters about the sort of threats for which that community must be resilient.  By 
its very nature, geography will also have an effect on industry and thus, the man-made 
disasters that could affect a community as well.  For example, oil terminals along the 
Louisiana coast bring an additional environmental hazard in the face of storm surge that  
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would otherwise not be there, but the very nature of the coastline makes it desirable to 
build up such infrastructure at the natural junction of offshore acquisition and inland 
shipping.   
Finally, as a factor of the geography of a community, the perception of risk as a 
personal issue to a population is determined by the perceived level of safety of the 
environment as it affects the livelihoods and actions of the community (Paton, 2008).  In 
other words, if the environment threatens life and property routinely or severely, a 
population is more likely to take mitigation actions to prepare for disaster due to greater 
feeling of vulnerability.  If the environment does not produce frequent threats, or the 
threats are relatively minor, a sense of complacency will tend to overtake the community 
and less emphasis be placed on preparation. 
4. Sociology 
Susan Cutter and others have spent a great deal of effort developing social indices 
that measure effects of various sociological factors upon overall community resilience 
(Cutter et al., 2003).  In this work, they attempted to veer from the traditional look at 
vulnerability based on individual statistics (e.g., age, race) and bring an indexing equation 
to the social factors that affected vulnerability and resilience.  These factors include 
things like degree of urbanization, growth rates and economic viability that are often 
overlooked by looking more at individual characteristics and less at the factors that create 
social inequality. 
Looking deeper into community dynamics, a broad study of work begun with Ann 
Swidler has evolved around the “cultural tool chest” or aspects of a set community that 
give it the ability to react differently to the same stimuli than another community or 
group (1986).  These may be defined factors such as geography or economy, or they may 
be intangibles such as the myth of the model minority—defined by Chamlee-Wright and 
Storr as a hard-working, no-nonsense minority that blends into the society and does not 
“make waves” (2007)—which, though not proven through sociological study, has created 
enough of a mindset to be able to influence the actions of a group.  Luthar and Cicchetti 
(2000) looked into whether these cultural tools make a particular community more 
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resilient than another, evidence corroborated in the study on post-Katrina recovery in 
similar Black and Vietnamese communities (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2008).  In the 
latter study, the researchers looked at multiple recovery factors—economic, population, 
return to previously flooded neighborhoods—and compared the two communities. In so 
doing, they noted significant disparities among ethnic groups who also happen to fall into 
different political subcultures.  One additional study conducted in rural Tasmania to 
measure the effect of social capital on the well-being of community members found that a 
great many cultural norms, or tools, directly influence the resilience of communities and 
indeed the very nature of the community in terms of its cohesion, intrinsic support, and 
efficacy toward its members (Kilpatrick & Abbot-Chapman, 2005). 
B. POLITICAL SUBCULTURE 
1. Theory of Political Subculture 
Daniel Elazar (1984) postulated that there were divisions across the United States 
that can be grouped into political subcultures.  He defined political subculture as “The 
particular pattern or orientation to political action in which each political system is 
imbedded” (Elazar, 1966).  Each of these subcultures views the role of government 
differently, partially driven by perception of government as service and partially by 
influence of religion on morals and standards of the populace.  Each group arose from 
socio-cultural differences among the people moving to and settling in the United States as 
far back as the original colonization and continuing through intra-border immigration 
today.  Initial geographic distribution of the three dominant subcultures was established 
by migratory patterns and the tendency of various ethnic and religious groups to 
congregate together, even upon internal migration and re-settling.  The interplay of these 
groups and the ties back to original settlements, however, have worked to create a weave 
of subcultures that act to tie states and communities together despite geographic 
separation and intermingling of different subcultures.  The patterns and values of the 
subcultures within a state or region grant a particular character to that state or region and 
help establish its fundamental (and unique) relationship to the nation. 
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The first of his subcultures is the Moral group.  This group originally settled in 
northern New England, the northern Midwest and the western/northwestern states, 
strongly influenced by the religious factions emigrating into the founding settlements.  In 
this group, the good of society trumps the good of the individual, but does not subsume it, 
and politics is viewed as a force for good in that it enacts change to the benefit of society. 
Values within this group derive heavily from agrarian roots and tend to be the force 
behind the American dream of a “good society” (Elazar, 1984, p. 141).  This subculture is 
often associated with the “Yankees” of the northeast, despite the migration as far as 
southwestern California of this particular culture.  It tends to be the culture that drives the 
values evaluation of politicians—looking beyond basic promises and platforms to the 
very nature of the person as a representative of society, or what the society would choose 
as its voice.  This subculture finds its roots in Puritan ethics and manifests high standards 
from its representatives.  The subculture will limit personal freedoms in seeking a better 
social order and tends to act as a check to unlimited market power at the expense of 
social good. 
The second group, Individual, originally encompassed the Mid-Atlantic states and 
some areas of the west.  Politics and government are largely viewed as utilitarian and best 
kept out of local and community affairs.  However, government is a necessity from which 
the individual cannot escape so engaging in citizenship to the extent necessary is 
acceptable.  Much of the founding influences of this group came from Irish immigrants 
who would tolerate a great deal of political corruption and outright inaction as long as it 
did not affect the market and trade.  This subculture enables integration of diverse groups 
into the framework of American culture by virtue of espousing the “bootstrap” theory of 
hard work leading to monetary success and trumpeting individual freedom as the pinnacle 
of societal goals.  This has created the beacon of “The American Dream” that has brought 
so many different peoples into the country in quest of freedoms not found in their former 
lives.  Left unchecked, however, the individualistic subculture does promote individual 
success at all costs—as long as the actions take place in the market, anything is allowed 
to pursue success—and can stratify a society economically very quickly. 
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Finally, the group originating mostly in the south is Traditional where government 
is viewed as a positive influence in that it maintains the state of order and hierarchy of 
society while family drives most local concerns (Riley, 2010).  Elazar emphasizes that 
this subculture is driven by a quest for continuity and legitimacy, though often at the 
expense of civil rights and opportunity for varied groups of people.  When led by an elite 
figure, it is the idyllic Americana of family, stability, and normalcy.  Without that first-
rate elite, however, Traditional subcultures can devolve into oligarchic societies where 
former elites resort to bigotry to maintain the status quo of their society in the face of 
reduced economic and political power.  Because of the deeply-entrenched connection 
with its roots, however, the Traditional subculture can produce superb national leaders 
who, versed in the foundations of America as they know it, seek to draw the country back 
to dreams of a better yesterday in the face of uncertain tomorrows.  By consequence, 
communities with a Traditional leaning tend to look for these elites to rise and lead the 
society back from disruptions in the status quo, but are conditioned to not put forth 
individuals who cannot claim to the “legitimacy” of that elite class. 
Elazar further established that the general migration across the United States, 
which had the effect of intermingling immigrants, religions, families, and other 
influences upon culture, led to a blending of political subcultures (see Figures 1 and 2).  
As such, no clearly defined boundary exists between Individual and Traditional, for 
example, and the continued evolution of the American frontier (as seen in changes in 
populations, migratory patterns, and the “agrarian-to-urban” shift) alters the geography of 
the initially-postulated characteristics of each subculture.  While some patterns such as 
the farm-to-city movements only concentrated values of outlying regions into a stronger 
base, others, such as the general westward expansion, saw the original spheres of 
subculture influence blurred and comingled.  Elazar noted, though, that even with 
intermingling and sharing of ideas and values—a cultural inevitability that evolutionand 
devolution will occur over time—the general predominance in regions tends to unite 
individual states within those regions even in the face of differences in economics and 
material interests.    
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Figure 1.   Migration of Political Subcultures (From Elazar, 1984) 
As seen in Figure 1, there has been a great deal of shifting of the initial postulated 
subculture regions.  The result of this is the blending of subcultures across the country.  
Elazar noted, however, that even as populations moved and intermingled, people of 
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similar mindset and culture tended to gather together.  The result of this, while not 
necessarily apparent from an overview of the entire country, is communities or portions 
of communities that display a dominant political subculture.  This means that the 
overview in Figure 2 is representative of overall regional trends, but does not capture the 




Figure 2.   Post-Migration Geography of Political Subculture (From Elazar, 1984) 
Subcultures take into account views on politics and government but do not fully 
define the regions to which they are tied (i.e., there is more to a community than its 
political subculture).  At its most basic level, political subculture influences, but does not 
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dictate, the actions of the associated community.  In this aspect, a number of authors, 
most notably Peter Nardulli have criticized Elazar’s work as too broad (Nardulli, 1990) 
and have attempted to bore deeper into the culture of communities and what influences—
migration, familial contacts—have shaped those cultures (Lieske, 2004). Elazar’s 
research is also over two decades old and does not account for the influx of immigrants or 
changing population demographics across the United States (U.S.).  That said, Hanson 
points out, based on overall subculture dynamics and reactions to both government and 
significant events, the idea of three subcultures still holds true as though the changing 
population acclimatized to the dominant subculture of the community rather than the 
reverse (Hanson, 1992).  Elazar’s theory also grounded itself heavily in religion and the 
effects of faith upon views of national and trans-national organizations and institutions.  
This is corroborated by additional research into the definitions of culture such as those 
espoused by Kim (2009). 
A lingering question yet to be studied in existing research is whether Elazar’s 
political subcultures are a part of or are enhancements to a “cultural toolbox” for their 
representative geographical communities, and if so, whether the political subculture 
influences the resilience of those regions.  Primarily, resilience is considered to be a 
product of economy, geography, demography and sociology of an area or region.  Thus 
resilience, though, may well be modified or adjusted by the political subculture of the 
affected area.  While it would seem to be the case as seen in the differing responses to 
disasters across the U.S., no real empirical evidence seems to point to a direct link 
beyond interpretation of events as seen through Elazar’s lens (Nardulli, 1990).  If one 
takes Elazar’s theory of political subculture to be true, or mostly true, then it is a logical 
step to say that subculture is one of the intangible cultural tools that affect communities.  
Based on this thought and Swidler’s theory of “cultural toolboxes,” there is a yet 
unexplored link between political subculture of a community and its resilience to disaster. 
The individual pieces of the formula—Elazar’s theory of political subculture, 
Swidler’s “cultural toolbox” and overall community resilience—are readily at hand 
through research.  As of yet, however, they have not been mathematically aligned to 
measure the effect on resilience.  If such a relationship exists, local, state and federal 
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governments could use it to aid communities in preparing for, weathering and better 
recovering from disasters by tailoring messages, aid and education to fit the community 
culture.  Thus, it is of benefit to explore the multiplicative effect of political subculture 
upon known resilience measures within communities, which is the goal of this thesis.  
Any factor that modifies a planned resilience value either up or down has significant 
impact by creating a truer picture of a community’s state of preparedness and 
survivability. 
2. Geographic Considerations 
As mentioned in the overview above, additional limits of current data on Elazar’s 
theory are the exact definition of the geographic regions representing each subculture and 
the intermingling of various cultures within regions and even communities due to 
migration and population changes.  Elazar postulated some broad areas and some work 
has been done since then to define more concrete boundaries, but changing demography, 
“urban to suburban” population shifts and immigration have changed some of the former 
regions.  Elazar himself noted a shift in population over time and that some areas of 
formerly clearly bounded subculture have subsequently intermingled and co-located as an 
inevitable evolution of cultures.  Original foundations for majority subculture distribution 
are illustrated in Figure 3 and are indicative of the overall subculture leanings of the 
illustrated states, but this does not fully highlight the blend of cultures within each region 
and state (see Figure 2).  This blend created shifts within traditional boundaries, values 
and norms of each subculture, such as Moralistic politicians embracing a more 
Individualistic economic-driven set of values to enhance their appeal to their 
constituency.  One item highlighted by Elazar is the fact that even in blended societies 
groups or neighborhoods will demonstrate a dominant political subculture based on the 
tendency of people of similar mindset and background to gather together. 
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Figure 3.   Initial Dominant Political Subculture (From Riley, 2010) 
Glenn Richardson, Jr., and Amy Jasperson (2008) have attempted to corroborate 
Elazar’s original mapping via a unique look at the tone and nature of political advertising, 
noting that the nature of the political advertisements reflects an understanding of and 
focus on the political subculture of the region.  Much as advertising is carefully planned 
out to appeal to the market demography by highlighting known concerns, likes or 
favorites, political advertising must play to the view of politics of the community in 
which it is aired to have maximum effectiveness.  Jasperson and Richardson looked at 
over 200 campaign ads as well as in-depth case studies to prove that ads toned in 
alignment with dominant regional culture find a more receptive audience among voters 
(Richardson & Jasperson, 2008). 
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These scholars noted that there is a great theoretical appeal with some empirical 
support for Elazar’s theory but sought to expound upon the point where Elazar’s political 
subculture would be most expected to reveal itself.  The authors noted that, particularly in 
state and local (i.e., community-based) campaigns, candidates are compelled to explicitly 
address voters’ geographic and political identity.  Their work expands on previous 
research done by Richard Joslyn in 1980 that omitted the traditionalistic subculture.  
Through the course of their research, Richardson and Jasperson concluded that Elazar’s 
formulation was not as precisely defined as it could be, but was viable and explained a 
great deal about policy outputs and elite orientations with a theory operable in terms of 
three distinctive subcultures (2008).  They concluded by noting that Elazar’s theory is 
based firmly in dominant and subdominant strains of culture in each state, and in 
differing regions within states, a finding that aligns itself well with the overall theoretical 
bounds of Elazar’s three subcultures (Richardson & Jasperson, 2008). 
Finally, given the religious factor that helped shape Elazar’s initial postulate 
(1966), some work has been done to verify the initial assumptions of state cultures based 
on current religious data with the intent of creating a more valid mapping to help predict 
political trends within the states.  Watson and Morgan reviewed religious census data 
from the states as of 1980 to update the initial construct used by Elazar that took into 
account turn-of-the-century data (1991).  Their findings indicated an overwhelming 
validity and alignment of current trends (as of 1990) with Elazar’s initial theory (Morgan 
& Watson, 1991).  The sole exception was Florida that saw a shift away from the 
Traditionalistic subculture due to shifts in population away from fundamentalism to more 
main-line religions.  Overall, however, their data indicated that the initial mapping of 
political culture by state was, for the most part, valid (Morgan & Watson, 1991). 
This still leaves a shortcoming in the overall data concerning political culture of 
communities and results in the overall data being skewed more to a regional/state 
perspective.  It is possible that some variance in political culture, by county or city within 
a state, predominantly of one subculture, might result in differentiation of overall data.  
For purposes of focus, however, this thesis will focus on community-specific effects as 
bounded by the dominant regional subculture and indicative community behaviors. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
In order to seek a link between community resilience and political subculture, the 
author employed an analysis of historical case studies followed by a comparison of case 
study data to predicted resilience values.  The intent of this comparison was to determine 
deviation from predicted data, thus demonstrating possible influence of political 
subculture upon community resilience.  
A. SCHEME OF ANALYSIS 
The first step of this method was to seek case study data from areas representative 
of Elazar’s three subcultures.  This effort was somewhat hampered in that, due to 
migration within the United States, no area demonstrates a singular subculture.  A 
predominant subculture is evident in each of the identified case study communities, 
however, making comparison to anticipated behavioral data possible.  Each case study 
community suffered a disaster that significantly, on a per capita basis, affected the 
community and tested its resilience.  Each case study represented damage significant 
enough to affect the majority of the community and in so doing, the predominant political 
subculture. 
Secondly, each community was analyzed based on historical and census data to 
determine additional influencing characteristics such as educational attainment, economic 
bases, dominant industries, and demographic factors that additionally shape resilience.  
This was done in order to ensure comparison of actual post-disaster actions versus 
predicted behaviors was done with a foreknowledge of other influencing factors.  The 
intent of this effort was to make sure each community was compared in a similar manner 
to ensure results were statistically comparable and that damage was accounted for on a 
per-capita basis in an attempt to mitigate the effect of different community sizes and 
backgrounds on the analysis. 
Next, data was obtained for each community using the Social Vulnerability Index 
or SoVI (Cutter et al., 2003).  While not the only measure of resilience and vulnerability 
available, the SoVI is extensively researched and  has been updated by University of 
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South Carolina staff and provides a comprehensive measure of predicted vulnerability 
(and by consequence, resilience) based on 32 academically-accepted factors that fall into 
the disciplines of demography, geography, economy and sociology.  The SoVI does not, 
however, account for political subculture in its calculations.  It serves to provide a 
consistent baseline metric for predicted behavior against which actual response was 
compared to determine variance and variable factors. 
Data from the SoVI was compared to actual recovery timelines and measures of 
return to normalcy such as repopulation, post-disaster population, and economic growth.  
The SoVI provides a numerical value of vulnerability that can be transposed to determine 
how likely a disaster would be to significantly affect a community.  The original 2003 
SoVI scale is based on deviations from the mean (either above or below) with factors 
increasing vulnerability contributing to positive deviations above the mean while factors 
enhancing resilience provide negative index values below the mean. A community found 
to be within the mean range of the SoVI (i.e., less than one standard deviation above or 
below) is theoretically less vulnerable to a disaster than one more than a standard 
deviation away from mean.  This index was further refined in 2009 to be represented on a 
numerical scale of 0.0-8.0 where higher numbers are indicative of increased resilience.  
In this method, the SoVI is a comparative metric that can be used to predict differential 
response to disasters.  This predicted response was then compared to the actual response 
to determine if a relationship could be found between political subculture and resilience.  
In the case study analysis, data from the 2003 SoVI was used as an initial characterization 
of the community while the 2009 numerical value was used in the final comparison of 
predicted resilience to demonstrated resilience.  This shift in SoVI values was done to 
avoid the potential variables of using mean/deviation data (as found in the 2003 study) 
and instead, focus on a more consistent, single-number value (as presented in the 2009 
study) for comparison.  In this way, rather than compare a range of numbers, concrete, 
single figures are used to make contrasts easier to note. 
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B. LIMITATIONS OF METHOD 
This analysis method has several limitations that preclude it from providing a 
definitive and bounded relationship value for the modifying effect of political subculture 
on resilience.  That said, the intent was to explore whether a relationship exists and in so 
doing to provide a basis for further research to quantify that relationship. 
First, the case studies themselves are representative of only one sample of each 
type of subculture and thus are not statistically valid.  Further research encompassing 
additional communities would be required to generate a true statistical model.  This thesis 
sought only evidence of connection and not quantifiable statistical data. 
Additionally, the communities chosen for analysis are different in size, history 
and overall makeup as evidenced in the descriptive portion of the case studies.  To 
alleviate this variance within this paper, the SoVI was used to provide a comparative 
value that was consistently derived across all communities.  Further research could look 
at other measures of relationship by comparing similar size communities and additional 
measures of resilience to solidify and quantify the relationship of political subculture and 
resilience.  A potential area for follow-on research would be to further compare the 2003 
and 2009 SoVI data against Elazar’s model of subculture migration and see if another 
connection could be made based on changes in community vulnerability. 
The factors used to determine community return to normalcy were also limited in 
this thesis to pre- and trans-disaster evacuation rates and follow-on repopulation data.  
Additional factors such as educational rates, economic growth, restoration or loss of key 
industry and demographic shifts should be considered in future research to further define 
what a true state of normalcy is for a community. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
In the following pages, three separate case studies are illustrated—one each 
representing a Traditionalistic, Individualistic and Moralistic community.  Each suffered 
a disaster of significance (on a per-capita basis for the community affected) that tested the 
resilience of the community.  By examining the response to the disaster in terms of 
recovery speed and repopulation data (two illustrative factors of resilience as defined as a 
return to a state of normalcy), it is possible to expand upon the idea of community 
resilience as more than an attribute determined by geography, sociology, economy and 
demography.  While these factors are the accepted determinants of primary influence 
upon resilience, this thesis purports to show that political subculture, as a regional or 
community attribute, acts as a modifier upon the resilience of a community, either 
enhancing or detracting from the overall resilience depending upon the culture in 
question. 
All three communities involved in the case studies are quite different in 
population size and primary economic basis.  Each was chosen as representative one of 
Elazar’s subcultures and for the fact that the disasters caused, on average, a similar per 
capita impact to the citizens of that community. 
By way of review, Susan Cutter et al., developed an index called the Social 
Vulnerability Index (SoVI) encompassing the factors of demography, economics, 
sociology and geography, ranking all counties in the United States for vulnerability to 
natural disaster (Cutter et al., 2003).  The formula allowed for comparison of counties 
using eleven factors: personal wealth, age, density of the built environment (as a measure 
of economic robustness), single-sector economic dependence, housing stock and tenancy, 
race, ethnicity, occupation, and infrastructure dependence.  These factors, taken together, 
give a range of values from -9.6 (low vulnerability) to 49.51 (very high vulnerability) 
with a mean value of 1.54.  The counties were noted by range of standard deviations from 
the mean, with counties scoring one or more standard deviations from the mean being 
most vulnerable (least resilient) while those scoring at one or more standard deviations 
below the mean were categorized as the least vulnerable, indicating greater resilience to 
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disaster.  Given the robust data available, this can provide a good measure of resilience 
against which Elazar’s political subculture can be compared to seek the value of 
subculture as a multiplier to resilience (see Figure 4).  The SoVI is by no means the only 
measure of resilience available but does provide a comprehensive and quantitative value 
against which the postulate of political subculture as a modifier can be weighed, while 




Figure 4.   Social Vulnerability Index By County (From Esri, 2010) 
A. TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE—HURRICANE KATRINA 
1. Southeast Political Subculture 
According to Elazar, the Traditionalistic subculture is most likely to search for 
continuity and has produced some notable national leaders from among its elites.  The 
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theoretical boundaries of the Traditionalistic subculture lie within the southern United 
States, mostly in the southeast but has spread across the whole of the southern part of the 
nation to Arizona. 
This subculture region is noted for emphasizing the legitimacy of government, as 
least as far as its representatives understand the concept (Elazar, 1984).  By this view, one 
would anticipate a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth.  “Good” 
government maintains traditional patterns and adjusts to changing conditions with 
minimal upset to the status quo.  In short, the government is expected to take care of the 
community with little to no involvement on the part of individuals, with the exception of 
the “elites” of a society who take the leadership role. 
By this measure, with the individual not expected to truly take a hand in the 
running of government or of the society, one can expect that resilience would tend to be 
lower, rates of recovery slower and repopulation more gradual as individuals wait for 
their elected officials to bring things back to the norm and reestablish societal order.  If 
individuals are conditioned by their culture to not become involved in the running of their 
society, they will not be inclined to take proactive or reactive measures beyond basic 
human “fight or flight” responses.  In this aspect, the resilience of the community would 
be lessened due to the reduction in individual contributions to the whole. 
For pre-storm resilience-oriented data on New Orleans, the 2000 U.S. Census 
report provided good data based on wide population surveys and consistent sampling 
methodology.  This demography, geography, education, and economy data is presented in 
this cases study, as well as the two that follow, to illustrate the nature of the community 
in review.  While this thesis is looking at connections between political subculture and 
resilience, factors such as those illustrated by the following data are known to have an 
effect on resilience as well.  The data serves to illustrate the community and factors 
which affect its resilience—for example, poverty levels (often tied to lower educational 
attainment) increasing demand on community government for support and reducing 
resilience (Clovis, 2008). In addition, this data further serves to illustrate similarities and 
differences in the case study communities.  For example, average household income is 
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similar across all three communities, but the distribution of that income varies 
significantly, indicating a common baseline with differing resilience dispositions.   
In terms of demography, the New Orleans population was reported to be 53.1 
percent female and 46.9 percent male, with 47.8 percent of the population between the 
ages of 18 and 49.  Twenty-five point five percent of the population was older than 50 
and 5.7 percent older than 75.  Sixty-six point six percent of the population was black, 
26.6 percent white, 3.1 percent Hispanic and 2.3 percent Asian.  Educational attainment 
among the population was distributed at 25.4 percent with a twelfth grade or less 
education with no diploma, 24 percent with a high school education or GED, 27.5 percent 
with some college and 23.1 percent with a Bachelor’s degree or higher.  Average 
household income was $43,176 across the parish and $35,693 as the average for 
households reporting less than $200,000 incomes.  Fifty-three point six percent of 
households fell at this level or below, with 21 percent reporting an annual income of 
$10,000 or less (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  The geography of Orleans parish is 
primarily urban, bounded by the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Pontchartrain, and the Mississippi 
River delta.  In addition, a majority of the parish is actually situated below sea level, in 
some places as much as 15 feet below requiring a great deal of levees, anti-flooding 
pumps and channels and other water control measures (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  
Economically, the primary sources of income include marine agriculture, tourism (food 
and lodging services), health care, social services, and petroleum products transportation 
and distribution (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  Given these conditions, the relative 
resilience would tend to be lower due to lesser education and resources as well as 
geographical constraints and vulnerabilities.  These factors are accounted for in the SoVI 
value for the parish which indicates high vulnerability and low resilience. 
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Table 3.   New Orleans Population Data Summary 
Male Female 18-49 50-74 75+ White Black Hispanic Asian 
46.9% 53.1% 47.8% 25.5% 5.7% 26.6% 66.6% 3.1% 2.3% 
Table 4.   New Orleans Educational Attainment 
No Diploma High School/GED Some College Undergraduate 
Degree or Higher 
25.4% 24% 27.5% 23.1% 
Table 5.   New Orleans Income  
Average Household Income Households At/Below 
Average 
Households Below $10K/yr 
$43,176/yr 53.6% 21% 
2. Analysis 
Hurricane Katrina may be the most analyzed disaster in the continental United 
States.  On August 29, 2005, the storm came ashore over the Gulf of Mexico coastline 
centered on the New Orleans, Louisiana area as a category three hurricane.  An estimated 
1,836 people lost their lives and approximate property damages were estimated to be 81 
billion dollars (note this does not include government relief funds and second-order 
economic effects like disruption of the oil industry) (Knabb, Rhome & Brown, 2005).  
Total evacuees from the area, estimated to be the largest Diaspora group within the U.S., 
came to over one million individuals (Ladd, Marszalek & Gill, 2006).  This is especially 
significant when noting that the population of just one affected state—Louisiana—fell 
almost five percent when a census was taken over a year after the storm (Christie, 2006).  
This indicates that the repopulation and restoration of storm-wracked areas was not 
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complete, even with massive federal and state assistance.  Many factors affect this 
repopulation data and while Traditionalistic behaviors dominate the area, responses by 
individuals vary with most of the non-returning population citing the length of time for 
the area to return to normal as the reason for staying away (Levitz & Esterl, 2010). 
Concerning repopulation of the Gulf Coast region following the passage of the 
storm and into subsequent time, suitable housing was the key factor in reoccupation of 
the area (McCarthy, Peterson, Sastry, & Pollard, 2006).  Given the violence of the storm, 
much of the housing was destroyed, so the ability to rebuild and provide shelter for 
returning citizens must be considered as a part of the measure of resilience—it is, after 
all, a “rebound” to a state of normalcy.  The economic influence and status (cost of repair 
and material, availability of contractors) factors significantly in the resilience of the 
region.  Even if infinite resources were available, though, the will of the population to 
return must enable the rebuilding of the area.  For example, in New Orleans, a pre-
hurricane population estimate of 455,000 was reduced to 91,000 in December 2005.  By 
one year post-storm, population had risen to 152,000 and three years after the hurricane, 
it was estimated at 272,000 or 56 percent of pre-storm population (McCarthy et al., 
2006).  Four years after the storm, New Orleans census figures show population at 
355,000, or about 80 percent of pre-storm numbers (Plyer, 2010).  This data is taken as an 
overall figure and does not specifically drill into the lower levels of repopulation 
encountered in more heavily damaged parts of the city.   
A number of factors influence the repopulation data including mental and 
physical distress, housing availability, economic prospects and more, but for purposes of 
this analysis, data are taken at face value to represent a post-disaster picture of the 
population and resilience of affected communities.  In the case of the Gulf Coast, New 
Orleans is often viewed as a barometer for area statistics.  Data on the Mississippi coast 
shows less-extensive depopulation, but still significant with approximately a 13 percent 
population reduction as of 2007 (Chriszt, 2007).  In an area where the economy is heavily 
reliant on oil, tourism, and fisheries, this storm caused a direct impact to the financial 
ability to recover. 
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In all, despite massive federal and state efforts, communities all along the Gulf 
Coast recovered slowly and continue to lag behind pre-storm figures for population even 
five years post-disaster.   
The 2003 SoVI value for New Orleans per Cutter et al. shows Orleans Parish to 
be outside one standard deviation from the index mean, indicating the parish is one of the 
most vulnerable/least resilient counties.  For reference, all surrounding parishes are also 
in the “most vulnerable” category while the overall state shows an approximate 50/50 
split between “most vulnerable” (1+ standard deviations over the mean) and “more 
vulnerable (.5-1 standard deviations).  Armed with this data, it is reasonable to classify 
Louisiana in general and Orleans Parish in particular, as less resilient.  This will come 
into play later in analysis of all target regions to clarify the relation of political subculture 
to resilience. 
Given the nature of the traditional subculture of the region as outlined by Elazar, 
the expected behavior is that, in general, the people of the region look to government to 
restore the status quo and do not get overly involved in their own recovery efforts.  Based 
on this, the question of whether a relationship exists between resilience and the political 
subculture in Traditionalistic areas appears to be affirmed as the data does corroborate the 
expected behaviors.  In other words, repopulation occurred very slowly indicative of a 
very gradual return to normalcy and a lack of community effort to regain that normalcy.  
This is an assumption based on the numerical data and does not account for other factors 
involved in the area that may also have slowed recovery, but does point to an influence 
that ties with expected community behavior of waiting for outside assistance.  What is 
not known is to what degree the Traditionalistic culture affects the resilience of the area. 
While many news stories highlight individual or even community triumphs to the 
contrary, data from this disaster points to the expected behavioral trend in the region that 
has yet to see complete return of displaced citizens or full establishment of pre-storm 
services and business. 
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B. INDIVIDUAL SUBCULTURE—MIDWEST FLOODING 
1. Background 
The Individualistic subculture, as defined by Elazar, is centered heavily on the 
maintenance of commerce and commercial efficiency (1984).  This subculture is less 
interested in the workings of government or in governmental influence in the lives of 
citizens barring that such influence/activity directly affects earnings and livelihood.  
Indeed, this subculture is the most tolerant of outright political corruption as long as it 
does not impact citizens’ lives—politics is viewed as a dirty, if necessary, business 
(Richardson & Jasperson, 2008).  
In this aspect, one can expect that citizens of Individualistic areas will be more 
self-reliant and less inclined to look to government for solutions given the assumed 
corrupt nature of politics.  Activities that drive return to normal market conditions will 
take precedence and post-disaster recovery should be based on a concept similar to an 
agricultural co-op with individuals pooling together to increase the revenue/market share 
of all, but done through individual contributions—the group will turn to help the 
individual last, so each individual is expected to be able to fend for him/herself.  In this 
aspect, a citizen of an Individualistic community would be anticipated to look to his/her 
restorative efforts first on the theory that the sooner business is restored, the sooner 
society will begin to operate smoothly again.  This, in turn, could be expected to show a 
steady, if somewhat slower, return to community normalcy.  The negative result of the 
disparate efforts of individuals might be a disorganized recovery as no coordination 
between individuals impairs a community-level response.  Given an inherent distrust of 
government, coordination efforts directed from a top-down aspect are likely to be met 
with indifference or ignored completely.  Barring that market issues drive collective 
efforts, actions will likely be solely individual. 
Of particular note in this case is that the dominant culture in the Midwest—Iowa, 
which was the most hard-hit by flooding, in particular—is Moralistic.  This is a 
representative of the foundational ground of this subculture.  Over time, though, the 
Individualistic subculture migrated westward from the northeast U.S., creating a 
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significant blend of the two cultures throughout the Midwest.  This blend does not 
necessarily imply that the communities will display both the “good of the community” 
behavior of a Moral subculture and the commerce-driven “bootstraps” behavior of an 
Individual subculture (Elazar, 1984).  Elazar noted that like attracts like and that 
communities and neighborhoods will display a tendency for citizens of similar mindset to 
settle together, creating a dominant subculture.  The primary community of focus in this 
case study, Cedar Rapids, lies in an area of mixed subculture, but exhibited traits 
exemplifying the Individualistic subculture in its post-disaster response.  The community 
was focused on restoring business and commerce via both pre-disaster and recovery 
actions. 
In terms of city data, Cedar Rapids mirrors the demographics of New Orleans in 
terms of male/female population at 48.7 and 51.3 percent respectively.  Fifty-two point 
three percent of the population lay between the ages of 18 and 50.  Twenty-four percent 
of the population was over the age of 50 and 6.6 percent over the age of 75.  Ninety-one 
point nine percent of the population was white, 3.7 percent black, and 1.7 percent each 
Asian and Hispanic.  Educational attainment within the population was 2.75 percent with 
a 12 grade (or less) education without diploma, 36.7 percent with a high school or GED 
diploma, 23.3 percent with some college, and 36.9 percent with college degrees of 
varying levels.  Average household income was $43,704 with 47.1 percent earning 
$40,000 or less per year.  Sic point one percent reported less than $10,000 per year (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2000).  Geography of Cedar Rapids is urban, situated upon the Cedar 
River and surrounded by agricultural, rolling terrain.  The area has numerous lakes and 
rivers throughout the surrounding terrain (City-data.com, 2010).  The economy of Cedar 
Rapids is primarily based in manufacturing of agricultural and food products, steel 
working and some electronics manufacturing (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  All of these 
factors point to a moderately robust community with a significant portion of individually-
based industries and a fairly resilient population based on education and economics.    
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Table 6.   Cedar Rapids Population Data Summary 
Male Female 18-49 50-74 75+ White Black Hispanic Asian 
48.7% 51.3% 52.3% 24.5% 6.6% 91.9% 3.7% 1.7% 1.7% 
Table 7.   Cedar Rapids Educational Attainment 
No Diploma High School/GED Some College Undergraduate 
Degree or Higher 
2.75% 36.7% 23.3% 36.9% 
Table 8.   Cedar Rapids Income  
Average Household Income Households At/Below 
Average 
Households Below $10K/yr 
$43,704/yr 47.1% 6.1% 
2. Analysis 
In June of 2008, massive flooding swamped large tracts of the Midwest United 
States with fifteen new 24-hour record precipitation levels being noted across the region 
(Gleason, 2010).  Overall regional data is difficult to locate (as one might expect given 
the Constitutionalist and individualistic nature of the region) though data can be garnered 
by state.  Most heavily hit was Iowa with 83 of 99 counties declared as disaster areas 
(Gleason, 2010).  Using that data as representative of the region, evacuations show in the 
realm of 10–15 percent of population (24,000 evacuations in a population of 200,000 in 
Cedar Rapids, for example, or 12 percent) (“500 Year Flood,” 2008).  Current census 
figures show the population of Cedar Rapids metro area at 256,324, indicative of not only 
a total repopulation post-disaster, but a 0.6 percent increase one year later (DeWitte, 
2010).  This indicates a complete repopulation within one year of the end of the disaster.  
This repopulation is congruent with individual subculture as citizens took it upon 
themselves to restore their livelihood as swiftly as possible.  The restoration of market 
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activity would also spawn an increase in population as additional people of similar 
subculture gravitated to the area, drawn by potential economic benefit and rapid return to 
the status quo. 
Interestingly enough, engineering officials such as the Director of Campus and 
Facilities Planning for the University of Iowa, Ron Lehnertz, noted that the disaster 
would have been far worse but for the individual preparatory efforts of citizens, National 
Guard soldiers, and students.  These citizens worked to buffer levees, build barriers to 
redirect flooding and to mitigate impact of the disaster by other preparatory efforts 
(Associated Press, 2008).  While this effort displays a collective activity, it is still 
symptomatic of individual subculture as each citizen took it upon themselves to act in 
order to facilitate survival and rapid restoration of their interests. This trend was not 
noted at all in the Gulf Coast where headlines showed people waiting on government 
intervention rather than taking preparatory actions at individual and community levels. 
Given the representative repopulation rates and speed with which the region was 
returned to normal, even in the face of some of the most massive agricultural economic 
losses in the country’s history, it appears that there is a greater degree of resilience in the 
region as defined as the ability to weather and recover from disaster. Linn County, where 
Cedar Rapids is located, rates as -1--.5 on the 2003 SoVI scale, indicating a reduced 
vulnerability to disasters.  This tends to indicate higher resilience in the county and was 
reflected in the response to the floods.  Despite the fact that the disaster affected the 
major cash crops—corn and soybeans—of the region, communities and individuals found 
the wherewithal to not only rise above economic disaster, but rebuild and subsequently 
flourish.  The drive to return to viable market conditions is also indicative of Elazar’s 
predicted behavior and values for Individualistic regions.  As seen in the 
Katrina/traditional case study, it seems that the political subculture of the Individualistic 
regions has a relationship to the overall resilience of those regions, but the exact degree to 
which it enhances this resilience is not yet determined. 
 45
C. MORAL SUBCULTURE—COLORADO TORNADOES 
1. Background 
Elazar’s moralistic subculture is prevalent in the western U.S. and draws most 
heavily on the values of an agrarian society (Elazar, 1984).  Elazar described this 
subculture as the primary source of the continuing American quest for the good society.  
To this end, citizens of these regions will subsume the individual needs for the greater 
good of society as a whole, and success is gained through an engaged citizenry 
(Richardson & Jasperson, 2008).  Government is expected to promote public good and 
remain honest and committed to the welfare of the governed.   
Taken as an anticipatory view, then, a Moralistic subculture community would be 
expected to turn the government to lead and direct a recovery effort while citizens 
provided the majority of the labor with all efforts focused on the good of the community 
as a whole.  No one individual would be singled out barring that he/she could not take 
care of his/her own needs.  Instead, the collective society would push to restore order for 
all, utilizing both internal (community) and external (governmental) resources.  Failing a 
government-directed effort, the community itself would be expected to conduct its own 
planning and execution of recovery with a steady progress toward normalcy. 
As in the previous case study, time and migration have seen a blend of 
subcultures established within Colorado.  Originally, the state was considered part of the 
foundation area of Moralistic subculture.  Currently, it is made up of a blend of 
Moralistic and Individualistic cultures spread across, and even within, the communities.  
For this thesis, focus was given to Windsor, which retained a great deal of the Moralistic 
culture of the traditional western U.S. 
Demographically, Windsor reported 49.1 percent male and 50.9 percent female in 
2000.  Forty-seven point seven percent of the population was between 15 and 44, 20 
percent between 45 and 64 and 7.8 percent over age 65. 87 percent of the population was 
white, 10.5 percent Hispanic, and 0.5 percent each Asian and black (Town of Windsor, 
2009).  Educational attainment was 8 percent with less than a high school education and 
no diploma, 23.7 percent with a high school or GED diploma, 28.9 percent with some 
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college, and 39.5 with a college degree or higher (U.S. Beacon, 2005).  Average 
household income for Windsor was $45,200 with 32 percent of the population averaging 
less than $50,000 and four percent earning under $10,000 (Town of Windsor, 2009).  The 
geography of Windsor is mostly flat plains east of Interstate 25 with some lightly forested 
areas and wide, grassy areas surrounding the town (U.S. Beacon, 2005).  Primary 
economic industry included manufacturing, public government services, health care, and 
retail trade (Town of Windsor, 2009).  All of these factors point to a small community 
highly centered on town functions and government with a fairly strong economic base for 
resilience.  The lower SoVI index value predicted for Windsor (as seen in the following 
chapter) is based heavily on lower population numbers resulting in a smaller workforce to 
enhance resilience and greater vulnerability to community-wide events. 
Table 9.   Windsor Population Data Summary 
Male Female 18-49 50-74 75+ White Black Hispanic Asian 
49.1% 50.1% 47.7% 20% 7.8% 87% 0.5% 10.5% 0.5% 
Table 10.   Windsor Educational Attainment 
No Diploma High School/GED Some College Undergraduate 
Degree or Higher 
8% 23.7% 28.9% 39.5% 
Table 11.   Windsor Income  
Average Household Income Households At/Below 
Average 
Households Below $10K/yr 
$45,200/yr 32% 4% 
 47
2. Analysis 
On May 22, 2008, a category E-F3 tornado devastated the small town of Windsor, 
a community-board-run town in northern Colorado with a population of around 19,000 
(Jaeger, 2009).  In all, 2,300 homes were sufficiently damaged to require significant 
claims and repairs (Arnold, 2008) representing 12 percent of the population.  The one 
month post-storm report indicates that the town manager and town board had already 
begun extensive coordination with Emergency Support Function 14 of FEMA and were 
looking to not only rebuild, but build new infrastructure into the recovery efforts.  Six 
month reports show a continued liaison with federal and state officials to best leverage 
assistance from outside agencies to the betterment of the town.  In addition, the six month 
reports notes that “most displaced citizens have returned home with a few individuals still 
facing insurance claim issues” (Arnold, 2008).  This indicates a near-complete 
repopulation within six months of the disaster.  While the population is admittedly far 
smaller than the previous two case studies, the devastation on a “per capita” basis was 
equivalent, if not more severe due to the limited community economic resources 
available to cushion the devastation.  
Within one year of the storm, all damage was rebuilt and the town board 
leveraged repair dollars to upgrade services for citizens to include enhanced 
transportation corridors, new town hall, new Art and Heritage Center and new police 
facilities (Jaeger, 2009).  Current census data shows a population of 19,768, or an 
increase of 0.04 percent, indicating complete repopulation and continued growth of the 
affected community (Town of Windsor, 2009). 
In coming together to direct recovery efforts to the best interest of the town, 
citizens of Windsor, Colorado displayed remarkable resilience that, like their counterparts 
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, has seen the community not only recover, but grow.  The 
economies of both areas are similarly agrarian and the tornadoes that cut a three-quarter 
mile-wide, 46-mile deep swath through northern Colorado destroyed a great many 
ranches and farmsteads.  Unlike the larger cities considered in previous case studies, 
Windsor did not have significant resources to direct toward rebuilding—any economic 
impact to the area is significant in that aspect without having to be, as in the case of the 
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2008 storm, massive.  In addition, the Windsor effort was extremely community-centric 
with the city government directing the efforts and aid from the state government, both 
emblematic of Elazar’s Moralistic subculture.  In contrast to Cedar Rapids where efforts 
were largely driven by individual interests, Windsor saw recovery efforts driven by a 
communal urge to restore the whole of the community.  This was less driven by 
individual commercial interests and even today is touted as a community-wide effort for 
the good of the entire town rather than a series of individual success stories. 
Windsor is located in Weld County which scored in the mean range on the 2003 
SoVI scale (-.5-.5 standard deviations).  This value would rate the county as average in 
terms of resilience. 
The collective response behavior demonstrated in Windsor aligns closely with 
expected response based on Elazar’s theories.  In addition, the resilience of the 
community is well demonstrated by the return to normalcy and ongoing success of the 
town.  Once again, this indicates that there is some relationship between the political 
subculture of the region and the resilience of the community in question.  The exact 




V. DEVELOPING AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF RESILIENCE 
A. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION OF CASE STUDY DATA 
1. Repopulation 
Repopulation, taken as a measure of return to normalcy, offers stark contrasts 
among the cast study communities.  The data from the case studies is summarized in 
Table 12. 
Table 12.   Repopulation One Year Post-disaster 











80% -66% Yes 
Cedar Rapids 
(Individualistic) 
12% +.6% Yes 
Windsor 
(Moralistic) 
12% +.04% Yes 
The first thing of note in this data is the disparity in scope between the New 
Orleans case study and the other two.  Given this wide range of evacuation numbers, it is 
plausible to question whether the political subculture did, in fact, affect the resilience of 
the communities involved or whether it was a function of the scope of devastation. 
To further expand upon the mathematical model, the author examined the same 
data from four years post-disaster to see what the average repopulation/year value is for 
each community.  Four years is intended to be representative of progress over time and is 
not fully complete. As 2010, U.S. Census numbers are not available at the time of 
writing, four years is the best data available.  In the case of Cedar Rapids (City of Cedar, 
2011) and Windsor (Town of Windsor, 2009), this data must be taken from census 




greater scope of review is intended to show that the influence of political subculture 
influences resilience and return to normalcy from immediately post-disaster through the 
foreseeable future. 
Table 13.   Repopulation 4 Years Post-disaster 











80% -20% 12.2% 
Cedar Rapids 
(Individualistic) 
12% +7.5% 2.025% 
Windsor 
(Moralistic) 
12% +9% 2.26% 
These forecasts do show an increase in population for all three affected 
communities over time.  The data shows significant growth in Cedar Rapids and Windsor 
(on a per capita basis), while New Orleans still lags 20 percent below pre-storm 
population numbers.  While the growth per year value for New Orleans is still greater 
than either Cedar Rapids or Windsor, both of the latter communities have grown above 
and beyond their pre-storm populations where New Orleans has yet to attain pre-Katrina 
population.  This is indicative of a greater resilience in terms of ability to recover to a 
state of normalcy from which community growth can occur.  The resilience of New 
Orleans would be surmised to be lower as true growth, in terms of progress to and 
beyond a pre-storm state, has yet to occur and will take at least two more years to achieve 
based on the numbers above. 
2. Social Vulnerability Index Data 
To further quantify the value of the modifier to resilience, a known value must be 
used to represent pre- and post-storm resilience that takes into account all other factors 
(economy, geography, demography and sociology) as a level playing field and 
extrapolation performed to see if a mathematical value can be developed.  A numerical 
representation of resilience can be assigned by using the SoVI as a base value which 
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takes into account the number of standard deviations from the mean vulnerability value 
for the U.S. as a whole (Cutter et al., 2000).  According to the revised 2009 SoVI map 
(Esri, Inc. 2010), baseline SoVI values for the case study communities are (on a scale of 
0.0-8.0 with higher being more vulnerable/less resilient) shown below: 
• New Orleans: 6.0 (low baseline resilience) 
• Cedar Rapids: 2.0 (high baseline resilience) 
• Windsor: 6.0 (low baseline resilience) 
Interestingly, the current data derived from the original 2003 SoVI formula and 
updated with current census figures show Windsor and New Orleans to have the same 
overall vulnerability index, and thus an equally low resilience.  This, taken in review of 
the case studies, indicates that other factors do modify the overall resilience of a 
community given the disparate responses to disasters.  The numerical values above would 
tend to indicate that Cedar Rapids should recover rapidly while Windsor and New 
Orleans would take longer to return to normal.  Since Windsor exhibited a rapid recovery, 
other factors must be modifying the resilience to enhance an otherwise low starting value.  
Likewise, the significantly slower recovery of New Orleans shows an even lower 
resilience than indicated by the SoVI value. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
1. Single Criteria Data 
The data above is suitably evocative and highlights an apparent relationship, but 
does have some limitations.  Primary factors evaluated include repopulation data and 
overall post-disaster growth/diminishment.  Additional factors that might need to be 
considered in further developing this theory include analysis of sublimation of Diaspora 
populations into evacuation communities.  As Elazar noted in his points about the 
continued migratory trends within the United States, a disaster evacuation can serve as a 
migratory impetus and should the host community appeal to the evacuees by similar 
cultures, values or better services, some populations will not return to their former homes 
no matter how resilient the community.  The factors that appeal to the evacuee 
populations, may still have ties to the political subculture from which they fled and to 
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which they found themselves sent to weather the disaster. Given the intermingling of 
cultures over the decades since Elazar’s theory was first published, it is very likely that 
enough familiarity can be found in differing communities to create a feeling of belonging.   
In addition, the exact degree to which political subculture modifies the resilience 
index of a community is unknown based solely on three case studies.  A more broad 
comparison of disaster recovery efforts giving a statistical sampling of areas of 
predominant political subculture and comparing those results to the SoVI data for those 




A. PREDICTED EFFECT OF POLITICAL SUBCULTURE ON RESILIENCE 
By its very nature, political subculture as defined by Elazar attempts to 
encapsulate the views of a community in regards to government and the role of 
government in the daily life of that community.  In concert with the data that shows 
increasing governmental involvement in disaster recovery and mitigation (as noted in 
Chapter I), one could reasonably expect that a community would be more resilient should 
it hold itself less reliant on outside assistance and effort.  In other words, citizens who 
hold a cultural bias towards independence and freedom of action should be more inclined 
to take necessary actions to preserve their liberties and way of life.  This may be affected 
by the overall individual knowledge of vulnerability and perspective on how prepared 
they must be for a given threat.  Likewise, citizens of a community that leans toward 
looking for government to preserve the status quo will be less inclined to take action on 
their own behalf, either in preparation for or response to an event. 
B. FINDINGS 
In summary, the answer to the question of whether political subculture has a 
relationship to resilience appears to be indicated by the results of comparison of SoVI-
based predictive data to actual response data and results as shown in the representative 
case studies.  While the exact degree to which political subculture modifies the resilience 
of a region or community is unknown, the sample case study data reviewed in this thesis 
shows that an influence does exist and can thus be considered a variable factor to the 
overall resilience of a community (either positive or negative).    
The above data concludes that political subculture - while not a determinant factor 
to overall resilience such as geography, economy, sociology or demography - appears to 
affect overall resilience of a community.  The varying subcultures can increase resilience 
(Moralistic in Windsor) or decrease it (Traditional in New Orleans).  Given the increasing 
severity of disasters, both in terms of overall numbers and overall cost to United States 
society as a whole, noting that this additional factor can either mitigate some lack of 
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resilience or detract from a perceived state of resilience will enable planners to better 
delve into how to allocate resources and time to preparing American communities to 
better survive disasters and return to a state of normalcy as quickly as possible. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
It is recommended that further analysis across multiple case studies be 
undertaken—possibly at varying levels (small town, city, major metropolitan area) across 
predominant known subculture regions to further pin down a more quantifiable value of 
the modifier provided by the dominant political subculture affecting the community.  
While continued migration and societal mixing will further blend the subcultures, Elazar 
did note that a predominant feeling will arise within even blended regions, and certainly 
the research into evaluating the subculture of an area or community based on political 
trends can be used to narrow down areas of focus.   
In addition, additional potential modifying factors such as educational attainment 
should be sought to further crystallize the true nature of a community’s resilience.  It may 
be found that areas of higher educational background are able to better recover from a 
disaster despite other influencing factors, indicating another variable in the overall 
calculation of resilience. 
Given a broader swathe of case study data leading to a better-defined numerical 
modifier value for each of the three subcultures, the resilience values for communities, or 
even sub-sections within communities, can be better defined and preparedness efforts 
better targeted to the needs of that community. For example, community planners can 
take census data and determine community political subculture from current surveys, then 
use that data against a predictive value such as the SoVI to determine if additional 
response assets should be allocated against more vulnerable neighborhoods that would 
otherwise be considered resilient based on predictive data alone.  This thesis has 
identified one of possibly several factors—each important in its own right for the effect it 
has upon predicted resilience.  In a world of increasing disaster costs and constrained 
fiscal resources, each step closer to mapping an effective measure of resilience will better 
ensure community survival and recovery. 
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